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The Declaration of Paris.
Notwithstanding the sound principles which the Law
of Nations has consecrated as the rule and guide for the
conduct of States in their several relations to each other, the
arbitrary and selfish aggressions of crafty or ambitious rulers
from time to time leads nations to ignore or violate the plainest
provisions of this code. In particular, it seems difficult to
maintain the political equilibrium across the Atlantic; and
the clash of arms too frequently without just cause mars the
harmony of the Concert of Europe. This disturbance and
discord is usually ended by a return and recognition of first
principles, which are re-asserted and embodied in rules or
articles subscribed by the immediately interested powers. The
normal relation of States and their citizens and subjects is
occasionally restored by the voluntary retirement of the trans-
gressor from an untenable and vicious position. A conspicuous
illustration of the abandonment of false positions by two great
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maritime powers occurred about the middle of the century.
The situation at that period is thus stated:
"On the breaking out of the war with Russia in 1854, as the
combined effect of the English principle, that enemy's goods
on neutral vessels are good prize, and the French doctrine, that
neutral goods on enemy's vessels are so, would have been to
almost put an end to neutral commerce, the English and
French Governments declared that although they could not
forego the right of seizing articles contraband of war, and of
preventing neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches, or
from breaking effective blockade, they would "waive the right
of seizing enemy's property laden on board a neutral vessel,
unless it be contraband of war." Neither was it intended "to
,claim the confiscation of neutral property, not being contra-
band of war, found on board enemy's ships."'
Thc Treat), of Paris, which terminated the Crimean War,
was signed on March 30, 1856. The representatives of
France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, Turkey, and Great
Britain, which had been parties to the treaty, at the suggestion
of the French plenipotentiary, assembled in conference for the
purpose of discussing the rules of maritime capture, and, on
April I6th, following, adopted a body of rules modifying the
existing rules or usage in respect to capture, which have since
been known as the Declaration of Paris. Since that date all
the remaining civilized powers have given in their adherence
to its principles, except the United States, Spain and Mexico.
The history of this declaration is shrouded in mystery.
Neither of the British diplomatists, directly concerned, have
given a full account of the negotiations; and the only detached
statement was one published by the French Foreign Minister
at the time. According to this statement, the declaration
would have been made by the bulk of the civilized states
whether Great Britain had acceded to it or not. In reference
to the abolition of privateering, it has been said that, perhaps,
the growing sense of humanity and the recollection of the
squalid abuses connected with this mode of spoliation had
I Kent, I, p. 128, note i, i3th Ed.
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something to do with its disuse. "But much was due to this
fact-the transformation of a merchant vessel into an efficient
cruiser was not so easy as it was in the days of Paul Jones or
Jean Bart."'
This declaration consisted of the following four articles, viz.:
I. Privateering is and remains abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the excep-
tion of contraband of war.
3, Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war,
are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective;
that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent
access to the coast of the enemy.
The United States and Great Britain had long stood com-
mitted to the following points, in their opinion, established in
the law of nations ;
I. That a belligerent may take enemy's goods from neutral
custody on the high seas; 2, that neutral goods are not sub-
ject to capture, from the mere fact that they are on board an
enemy's vessel; 3, that the carrying enemy's goods by a
neutral is no offence, and consequently not only does not
involve the neutral vessel in penalty, but entitles it to its
freight from the captors as a condition to a right to interfere
with it on the high seas. , . . While the Government of the
United States has endeavored to introduce the rule of "free
ships, free goods," by convention, her courts have always
decided that it is not the rule of war, and her diplomatists and
her text writers-with singular concurrence, considering the
opposite diplomatic policy of the country-have agreed to
that position.2
The Declaration of Paris changed the position of Great
Britain upon this question; and the United States, on the
breaking out of.the Civil War, communicated to the maritime
powers of Europe their readiness to adopt the second, third,
and fourth articles; and added that though they preferred
IJ. Macdonell, "Recent Changes in the Rights and Duties of Bellig-
erents and Neutrals according to International Law."
2 Dana's Wheaton, note to 475.
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them with the amendment proposed by President Pierce's
Secretary of State, MVIr. Marcy, in 1856, exempting private
property from capture at sea, and without the first article,
they were willing to adopt them as they stood. This offer
was declined by Great Britain and France, who desired to
make special restrictions and exceptions applying to the Civil
War and the Confederates.
Notwithstanding this, the United States made known their
intention to follow the second, third, and fourth rules of the
declaration during the Civil War. As the Executive policy
was likely to be at variance with the judicial precedents, it was
thought that the latter would come in conflict with the tenets
of the second article. The Executive has control of such
matters, however, by instructions to the navy as to the
capture of neutral vessels, and also by ordering restitution if
such capture should have occurred before adjudication is had.
As a matter of fact, no case is reported to have happened of a
,condemnation in opposition of either the second or the third
articles of the Declaration during the Civil War.'
In the absence of an amendment of the Constitution of the
United States by which the power "to grant letters of marque
and reprisal " shall be stricken from the enumeration of its
special grants-and such an amendment can scarcely be
anticipated as a possibility-it is insisted that there can legally
be no accession by the United States to the first article of the
Declaration.' But this is a point of no present importance, as
the proclamation of President McKinley in reference to the
existence of war between the United States and Spain, dated
April 26, 1898, announced that the policy of the govern-
ment is not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules
of the Declaration of Paris. And it is hardly probable that
the United States will ever resort to privateering. There is a
distinction between a privateer and a letter of marque in this,
that the former is always equipped for the sole purpose of
war, while the latter may be a merchantman, uniting the
I Snow, Int. Law, p. 163.
2 r. Winthrop, "The United States and the Declaration of Paris," Yale
Law Journal, March, 1894, p. 118.
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purpose of commerce to those of capture. In popular language,
however, all private vessels commissioned for hostile purposes,
upon the enemy's property, are called letters of marque.1 The
policy of the United States in regard to the second article of the
declaration and to the doctrine of" free ships and free goods"
has been expressed since the Civil Var in several treaties, and
the doctrine may be considered a settled one so far as the
action of the United States may be concerned.
2
The Right of Visitation and Search.
"In order to enforce the rights of belligerent nations against
the delinquencies of neutrals, and to ascertain the real as well
as assumed character of all vessels on the high seas, the law
of nations arms them with the practical power of visitation
and search. The duty of self-preservation gives to belligerent
nations this right. It is founded on necessity, and is strictly
and exclusively a war right, and does not rightfully exist in
time of peace, unless conceded by treaty. All writers upon
the law of nations, and the highest authorities, acknowledge the
right in time of war as resting upon sound principles of public
jurisprudence, and upon the institutes and practice of all great
maritime powers. And, if, upon making the search, the vessel
be found employed in contraband trade, or in carrying enemy's
property, or troops, or despatches, she is liable to be taken
and brought in for adjudication before a prize court."'
The British Government disclaim the right of search in time
of peace, but they long time claimed the right of visit, in order
to know whether a vessel, pretending, for instance, to be
American, and hoisting the American flag, be really what she
seems to be. But the Government of the United States would
not admit the distinction between the right of visitation and
search. They consider the difference to be one rather of
1 Upton, Maritime Warfare and Prize, p. x86.
2 Treaties between the United States and other Powers, 1776-1887, pp.
95, 200, 259, 249, 556, 585, 1196, 902, 938, 962, iloi, 1044.
3 Kent's Comm. I, p. 153, I3 th Edition. The limitations of this right
are suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in the opinion in the case of The
Nereide, 9 Cranch. 389.
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definition than principle, and that it is not known to the law
of nations. They would not admit the exercise of the claim of
visit to be a zg9ht, while the British Government conceded that,
if, in the e.kercise of the night of visit, to ascertain the genuine-
ness of the flag which a suspected ship bears, any injury
ensues, prompt reparation will be made. The British Govern-
ment have finally abandoned the claim of a right of visitation
in time of peace for the purpose of verifying the flag, except
so far as allowed by treaty. The intervisitation of ships at sea
is a branch of the law of self-defence, and is, in point of fact,
practiced by the public vessels of all nations, including those
of the United States, when the piratical character of the vessel
is suspected. The right of visit is conceded for the sole pur-
pose of ascertaining the real national character of the vessel
sailing under suspicious circumstances, and is wholly distinct
from the right of search. It has been termed, by the Supreme
Court of the United States, the rizt of approach for that
purpose;' and it is considered to be well warranted by the
principles of public law and the usages of nations.' This,
however, has never been supposed to draw after it any right of
visitation and search. The right of approach is for the sole
purpose of ascertaining the real nationality of the vessel sailing
under suspicious circumstances.
The seizure by Spain of the steamer Virginius, carrying the
American flag, upon the high seas in 1873, during time of
peace, has been justified by some authorities in the United
States who rest the ground of seizure on the great right of
self-defence, which, springing from the law of nature, is as
thoroughly incorporated into the laws of nations as any right
can be. The Attorney-General of the United States, however,
took the following ground:
" Spain, no doubt, has a right to capture a vessel with an
American register and carrying the American flag, found in
her own waters, assisting or endeavoring to assist the insurrec-
tion in Cuba; but she has no right to capture such a vessel
on the high seas upon an apprehension that, in violation of
'The Mariana Flora, ir Wheaton, I, 43.
2Bynk, Q. J., Pub. lib., e. 114, s. p.; Kent's Comm. I, p. 153, note.
FROMf THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW.
the neutrality or navigation laws of the United States, she was
on her way to assist said rebellion." Even assuming that the
vessel was lawfully seized, there was no justification for the
summary execution of foreigners by order of a court-martial ;
and both the United States and Great Britain demanded
reparation in behalf of those persons of their respective
nationalities who had been executed by the captors of the
Virginius. This reparation Spain had eventually to make.'
Mr. Webster, in his correspondence with Lord Ashburton,
stated the rule to be, "That while it is admitted, that excep-.
tions growing out of the great law of self-defence do exist,
those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the
necessity of that defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." And,
in the case of the Vi-ginius, this law of self-defence was
insisted upon in vindication of the actual seizure by a Spanish
gunboat on the high seas. But owing to the untoward fate
of the Virginis, the question of the legality of the seizure of
a bona fide American vessel, under similar circumstances to.
those attending the seizure of the Virginius, was thus not
definitely settled.
Halleck states the rule to be that there is no right, in time
of peace, except in cases of piracy everywhere, or of vessels
committing crimes against municipal law in the territorial
waters of the power making the visit, or of vessels suspected
of having hostile intent against a power in time of peace.
And, it being a doubtful exercise of a very delicate power, all
that can be said is, that a nation would make such search and
seizure at her peril.
"The right of visitation is, by the law of nature, an inter-
course of mutual benefit, like that of strangers meeting in a
wilderness. The right of search is for pirates in peace and for
enemies in war.2
"The United States Government," wrote Mr. Evarts, Sec-
retary of State in I 88o, " never has recognized and never will
recognize any pretense or exercise of sovereignty on the part
I Wharton's Dig. Intl. Law, III, 327; Snow, Int. Law, p. 44.
2 J. P. Adams, Memoir; see Wharton, Int. Law Dig. III, p. 122.
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of Spain, beyond the belt of a league from the Cuban coast,
over the commerce of this country in time of peace. This
rule of the law of nations we consider too firmly established
to be drawn into debate, and any dominion over the sea out-
side this limit will be resisted with the same firmness as if such
dominion were asserted in mid-ocean. The revenue regula-
tions of a country, framed and adopted under the motive and
to the end of protecting trade with its ports against smuggling
and other frauds which operate upon vessels bound to such
ports, have, without due consideration, been allowed to play a
part in the discussions between Spain and the United States on
the extent of maritime dominion accorded by the law of nations
which does not belong so them." 1
The exercise of the right of visitation and search must be
conducted with due care and regard to the rights and safety
of the vessels.2 If the neutral has acted with candor and good
faith, and the inquiry has been wrongfully pursued, the bellig-
erent cruiser is responsible to the neutral in costs and damages
to be assessed by the prize court which sustains the judicial
examination. The mere exercise of the right of search in-
volves the cruiser in no trespass, for it is strictly lawful; but
if he proceeds to capture the vessel as prize, and sends her in
for adjudication, and there be no probable cause, he is respon-
sible. It is not the search, but the subsequent capture, which
is treated in such a case as a tortious act. If the capture be
justifiable, the subsequent detention for adjudication is never
punished with damages; and in all cases of marine torts,
courts of admiralty exercise a large discretion in giving or
withholding damages.' The right of visitation and search is
sometimes laid under special restrictions, by convention be-
tween maritime states.
4
The Government of the United States admits the right of
1 Wharton, Int. Law Dig. III, p. 163, el seq.
2 The Anna Maria, 2 Wheaton, 329.
3 The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155 ; La Manche, 2 Sprague, 207 ; The Jane
Campbell, Blatchford Prize Cases, ioi; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170.
' See, for instance, Art. 17 of the Convention of Navigation and Com-
merce between the United States and the Peru-Bolivian Confederation,
May, 1838.
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visitation and search by belligerent government vessels of their
private merchant vessels, for enemy's property, articles con-
traband of war, or men in the land or naval service of the
enemy. But it does not understand the law of nations to
authorize, and does not admit, the right of search for subjects
or seamen. The claim of Great Britain to the right of search,
on the high seas, of neutral vessels, for deserters and other
persons liable to military and naval service, has been a question
of animated discussion between that government and the United
States. It was one of the principal causes of the War of 1812,
and remains unsettled to this day. In the discussions in 1842,
between Lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster, relative to the
boundary line of the State of Maine, the American Minister
incidentally discussed the subject, and intimated that the rule
hereafter to be insisted on would be, that every regularly
documented American merchant vessel was evidence that the
seamen on board were American, and would find protection
under the American flag. The right of search is confined to
private merchant vessels, and does not apply to public ships
of war or vessels in the public service. The captain of a mer-
chant steamer is not privileged from search by the fact that he
has a government mail on board.1
The right of search, as a belligerent right, is limited as
follows:
(a.) A neutral ship is not to be ordinarily searched when
on a voyage between two neutral ports.
(b.) As a belligerent right it can only be exercised when
war is raging.
(c.) It was to be under direction of the commanding officer
of the belligerent ship, and through the agency of an officer in
uniform.
(d.) It must be based on probable cause; though the fact
that this cause turned out afterwards to be a mistake, does
not of itself make the arrest wrongful. 2
(e.) Contraband goods cannot ordinarily be seized and
appropriated by the captor. His duty is to take the vessel
I The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28.
The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155 ; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170.
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into a prize court, by whom the question is to be determined.
(f) Where the right exists, a belligerent cruiser is justified
in enforcing it by all means in his power.'
(g.) In case of violent resistance to a legitimate visitation,
the vessel so resisting may be open to condemnation by a
prize court as prize. But this is not the case with mere
attempt at flight. And there should be no condemnation of a
neutral vessel whose officers, having no reasonable ground to
believe in the existence of war, resisted search.2
(h.) The right of search, so it is held by the powers of
Continental Europe, is not to be extended to neutral ships
sailing under the convoy of a war ship of the same nation.
This view, however, has not been accepted by Great Britain.
But in any view, the commanding officer of the convoy must
give assurance that the suspected vessel is of his nationality,
under his charge, and has no contraband articles on board.
Twiss 3 maintains it to be a clear maxim of law that "a neutral
vessel is bound, in relation to her commerce, to submit to the
belligerent right of search." It is not competent, therefore,
he insists, for a neutral merchant to exempt his vessel from
the belligerent right of search, by placing it under the convoy
of a neutral or enemy's man-of-war.'
The doctrine of the courts of the United States in this
relation has been stated above.
Mere evasive conduct, or subterfuges, which might be the
result of ignorance or terror, are not conclusive proof of
culpability.'
'Lawrence on Visitation and Search.
2 Field's Int. Code, 871.
3 Law of Nations, Part II, 96.
4 Kent's Comm. I, p. i54.
rThe Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227; Wharton, Int. Law. Dig. III, 325;
WYoolsey, Int. Law, i9o. "The Right of Search is inseparably bound up
with the right of seizing goods which fall under the description of Con-
traband ; and the latter right (although its limits are, as will be seen,
somewhat indefinite) is one of the most firmly established in the Law of
Nations. And rightly so. For War, although a legal, is none the less
an abnormal relation of States. The end of Var is Peace; and it is
accordingly proper that no State which does not take the responsibility
of itselfjoining in the war should interfere to render any aid to either of
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Blockade.
Blockade has been defined to be, the carrying into effect by
an armed force, of that rule of war which renders commercial
intercourse, with the particular port or place subjected to such
force, unlawful on the part of neutrals. Blockades may be
either military or commercial, or may partake of the nature of
both. As military blockades, they may partake of the nature
of a land or land and sea investment of a besieged city or sea-
port, or they may consist of a masking of an enemy's fleet
by another belligerent fleet in a port or anchorage where
commerce does not exist. At one time the United States
advocated the abolition of commercial blockades, but after-
wards, during the Civil War, established the largest commercial
blockade ever known. Among the rights of belligerents there
is none more clear and incontrovertible, or more just and
necessary in the application, than that which gives rise to the
law of blockade. The law of blockade is, however, so harsh
and severe in its operation, that, in order to apply it, the fact
of the actual blockade must be established by clear and
unequivocal evidence; and the neutral must have had previous
notice of its existence; and the squadron allotted for the pur-
poses of its execution must be competent to cut off all
communication with the interdicted place or port; and the
neutral must have been guilty of some act of violation, either
by going in, or attempting to enter, or by coming out with a
cargo laden after the commencement of the blockade. The
failure of either of the points requisite to establish the
existence of a legal blockade amounts to an entire defeas-
ance of the measure, even though the notification of the
blockade had issued from the authority of the government
itself. The Government of the United States has uniformly
insisted that the blockade should be effective by the presence
of a competent force, stationed and present at or near the
the parties, which woqld result in prolonging the conflict. Aid publickly
rendered by a State would of course properly be treated as itself an act of
war. . . . It is curious that the term Contraband, now so familiar, does
not appear in this connection until a late date." Contraband of War;
Juridical Review, July, 1898.
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entrance to the port; and they have protested with great
energy against the application of the right of seizure and con-
fiscation to ineffectual or fictitious blockades.!
The neutral has the general right of trade and access to a
belligerent unless this right comes in contact with the special
needs and operations of the other belligerent; but these needs
and operations, as in other matters of the kind, must be duly
set forth and carried on under certain rules and usages in
conformity with the law of nations. Among the first of these
rules is the one that the blockade must be properly instituted,
and sufficiently made known to all likely to be affected by its
institution. There is a difference in the usage of nations as to
the amount of notification necessary to be given to neutrals.
The practice of the United States and Great Britain, which is
followed by Germany and Denmark, is to recognize two kinds
of blockade, one defacto, which begins and ends with the fact
and which condemns no vessel attempting to enter the harbor
unless previously warned off, and the other a blockade of which
notice is duly promulgated and accompanied by the fact.
In the latter case it is to be presumed that the blockade
continues until notice to the contrary is given by the block-
ading state. In this case ignorance of the blockade is not
accepted as an excuse for sailing for the blockaded port or an
appearance in its vicinity. Being bound to a blockaded port
is considered evidence, under ordinary circumstances, of an
intention to violate the blockade. A neutral cannot be per-
mitted to place himself in the vicinity of a blockaded port, if
his situation be so near that he may, with impunity, break the
blockade whenever he pleases, and slip in without obstruction.
It is a presumption, almost de jure, that the neutral, if found
-on the interdicted waters, goes there with an intention to break
the blockade; and it would require very clear and satisfactory
-evidence to repel the presumption of a criminal intent.2 The
'The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28; The Sarah Starr, Blatchf. Pr. 69; The
Douro, ib. 62; The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474; The Circassian, ib. 135;
Kent, Comm. I, 145.
2The Cornelius, 3 Wall. 214; The Sea Witch, 6 Wall. 242; Kent, L,
145, 149, note; Snow, Int. Law, i49; The Diana, 7 Wall. 354.
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United States, although not a party to the Declaration of Paris,
have at a later date agreed to a clear and satisfactory defini-
tion of an effective blockade.
" It is expressly declared that such places only shall be
considered blockaded as shall be actually invested by naval
forces capable of preventing the entrance of the neutrals, and
so stationed as to create an evident danger on their part to
attempt it." 1
The Instructions by the United States Navy Department to
Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, issued June 20, 1898, are
specific as to this and as to Notifications to Neutrals. The
permissible exception to the general rule which requires the
presence of an adequate force to make a blockade effective is
the temporary absence of the blockading vessels through stress
of weather.
The Doctrine of Continued or Continuous Voyages.
This doctrine, which originated with Sir Wm. Scott, was
applied adversely to certain American interests in the last
century, and although repudiated by continental jurists and
by some American writers, it was, during the Civil War,
adopted and somewhat extended by American prize courts at
a time when it bore severely on certain interests and adven-
tures of English shippers and shipowners. Applied to the
carriage of contraband and to the breach of blockade, it
became the settled practice of the American prize courts
during the late Civil War.2 This doctrine, however, has not
been accepted by continental publicists, and in the case of
the Springbok, particularly, there has been sharp dissent by
authoritative English and American writers. It has been
pointed out that there is some variation between the earlier
and later opinions of Sir Wm. Scott.3 In the Hart case, it was
I U. S. Treaties, Italy, 1871, p. 507.
2 The Hart, 3 Wall. 559; The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28; The Springbok,
5 Wall. 1-28.
3 Wharton, Int. Law, III, R 3291, 362, 375; Snow, Int. Law, I57. "The
theory of continuity of voyage is not a new invention, but only recently
has it been applied to the violation of blockades. It is a revival of the
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held, if the guilty intention of transporting contraband goods
existed when the goods left their own port, such intent could
not be obliterated by the innocent intention of shipping at a
neutral port in the way, and that such voyages form one
transaction. A review of the Springbok case, and incident-
ally of the question of continuous voyages, was made in 1878
by Hon. J. C. Bancroft Davis, formerly Assistant Secretary of
State and later Minister to Berlin, as a reply to a paper by
Sir Travers Twiss.1 This review replies to the criticisms and
objections raised by that learned writer. Mr. Davis takes the
ground that the doctrine of continuous voyages, although
opposed by the continental publicists, is one held by the
English and American courts; that is to say, by the courts of
the principal maritime powers of the world, and hence, that
this doctrine cannot justly be regarded as one imposing special
and onerous restrictions upon neutral commerce. The fact
that the United States have been a defender of neutral rights
in the past does not, says Mr. Davis, require them to advocate
and justify a fictitious neutrality. In this case the Supreme Court
held that, "where goods destined for a belligerent port are
being conveyed between two neutral ports by a neutral ship, it,
though liable to seizure in order to the confiscation of the
goods, is not liable to condemnation as prize;" and that
"where the cargo was originally shipped with inten. to,
violate the blockade, to be transshipped at a neutral port,
the liability to condemnation, if captured during any part
famous rule of the war of 1756, by which it was held to, be incompatible
with neutrality for the subject of a neutral state to engage in time of war
in a commerce between a belligerent and his colonies when such com-
merce was interdicted by the latter belligerent in time of peace. With
the view of escaping the harshness of this rule neutrals took an inter-
mediate neutral port as the medium by which they carried on trade
between the colony and the mother country. In order to stop this trade,
Sir Win. Scott invented what he called the doctrine of continuous
voyages, by which the voyage from the intermediate port to the mother
country was held to be continuous with that between the colony and the
intermediate port, though no seizures were permitted except on voyages;
between the intermediate port and the belligerent port." Fauchille;
Du Blocus Maritime, Paris, 1882, 335 ff.
I Les Tribunaux de Prises des Etats Unis, Paris, 1878.
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of that voyage, attached to the cargo from the time of
sailing."
The law officers of the Crown advised the British foreign
office that "there was nothing to justify the seizure of the
bark Springbok and her cargo, and that her Majesty's Govern-
ment would be justified in demanding the immediate restitution
of the ship and cargo, without submitting to any hdjudication
by an American prize court. But while this was the law so
given, the British commissioner, when the case came before
the Mixed Claims Commission, under the Treaty of Washing-
ton, in May, 1877, united with the other commissioners in,
finding against the claimant for the cargo.
Down to this hearing it was understood that the British
Government, acting under the advice of its law officers, had
disapproved of the condemnation. Mr. Evarts' argument
before the Mixed Commission, however, went to show that
the condemnation, while, perhaps, sustainable under the
British system as defined by Lord Stowell,' was, in antagonism,
not merely to the doctrines set forth in Lord Stowell's time by
the United States, but to those modern restrictions of blockade,
by which alone the rights of neutral commerce can be sus-
tained against a belligerent having the mastery of the seas.
It is not strange that the British Commissioner should have
declined to set aside a ruling so consistent with the older
British precedents and so favorable to belligerent maritime
ascendency.' Dr. Francis Wharton, former Solicitor of the
Department of State, states forcibly the grounds of his dissent
from the ruling of a majority of the Supreme Court' and the
Mixed Claims Comrhission, and concludes by saying: "The
decision cannot be accepted without discarding those rules as
to neutral rights for which the United States made war in
1812, and which, except in the Springbok and cognate cases, the
Executive Department of the United States Government, when
'The title which Sir Win. Scott bore after the recognition of his
eminent services in Her Majesty's High Court of Admiralty.
2 Wharton's Int. Law Dig. III, 362.
3 Of the nine justices composing the Supreme Court at the time of the
decision in this case, four justices dissented.
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stating the law, has since then consistently vindicated. The
first of these is that blockades must be of specific ports. The
second is that there can be no confiscation of non-contraband
goods owned by neutrals and in neutral ships, on the ground
that it is probable that such goods may be, at one or more
immediate ports, transshipped or re-transshipped, and then
find their way to a port blockaded by the party seizing. The
ruling is in conflict with the views generally expressed by the
Executive Department of the Government of the United States,
a department which has not merely co-ordinate authority in
this respect with the judiciary, but is especially charged with
the determination of the law of blockade, so far as concerns
our relations to foreign states."'
The maritime prize commission, nominated by the Institute
of International Law at the session at Wiesbaden, condemned
the doctrine laid down and applied by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of the cargo of the Springbok, as
a serious inroad upon the rights of neutral nations, and as
inconsistent with the spirit of important amendments of the
rules of maritime warfare of which the United States has
been the zealous promoter.'
The United States has long been a leader in the assertion
and vindication of the Rights of Neutrals; and the surrender
or waiver of any the least of these rights would properly be
regarded with regret, while it would be justly condemned as
a sacrifice of principles which her eminent statesmen and rep-
resentatives have from the earliest days eloquently insisted
had become incorporated in the Law of Nations.3
Wharton's Int. Law Dig. III, 362.
2 Revue de droit international, t. XIV. p. 328 (1882).
' Two opinions inemorable in the history of International Jurispru-
dence, which were rendered by Mr. William Pinkney, American Com-
missioner, under Article VII of the Jay Treaty, A. D. 1794, in the cases
of the Belsey and the Neptune, present an exhaustive and fascinating
consideration of the principles upon which are founded the Rights and
Duties of Neutrals. The contemporary of many illustrious men, Mr.
Pinkney is a conspicuous figure in American history. Distinguished as
orator, jurist and diplomatist, his honorable and useful career emphasizes
the familiar lesson that not talents alone, but character and patient
industry are necessary to achieve great results, and to insure permanent
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The Case of The Circassian. A British ship, the Circassian
and cargo, was seized on the 4th day of May, 1862, between
Matanzas and Havana, as a prize of war, upon the allegation
that the master of the vessel was engaged in the voyage or
adventure to break the blockade of the port of New Orleans.
This seizure occurred after this city had been captured and
occupied by the Federal forces. The Supreme Court of the
United States held:
That the capture by the United States forces of the forts
commanding the approaches to the city, did not terminate the
blockade of New Orleans but on the contrary made it more
complete and absolute; that such blockade was not term-
inated by the military occupation of the city, the occupation
being limited and recent; that a simple blockade may be
established by a naval officer, acting upon his own discretion
or under direction of superiors, without governmental notifica-
tion; that a public blockade is established and notified to other
governments by the government directing it; that in case of a
simple blockade, the captors are bound to prove its existence
at the time of the capture; while in the case of public
blockade, the claimants are held to proof of discontinuance, in
order to protect themselves from the penalties of attempted
violation; that the blockade of the rebel ports must be
presumed to have continued until notification of discontinuance;
that it is the duty of the belligerent government to give prompt
notice, but it must judge for itself when it can dispense with
the blockade; that the proclamation of the President on the
12th of May, 1862, 6ispensing with the blockade of New
Orleans, is conclusive evidence that the blockade was not
terminated by military occupation on the 4th of May; that
sailing from a neutral port with intent to enter a blockaded
port, and with knowledge of the existence of the blockade,
subjects the vessel, and in most cases, its cargo; to capture
and condemnation; that destruction on the eve of capture, of
fame. Mr. Adams has said that it was his good fortune to have known
three individuals who were perfect in their respective characters : Mrs.
Siddons as Actress; Mr. Pitt as Parliamentary Debater; and Mr. Pinkney
as Lawyer.
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a package of letters, relating, no doubt, to the ship and voyage,
is a strong circumstance against the ship and cargo; that a
ship was bound primarily to Havana, does not relieve her from
the liability to capture, where the vessel was chartered and her
cargo shipped with the purpose of forcing the blockade, and
the destination to Havana only colorable.'
This ruling, it is said, conflicts with Thirty Hogsheads v.
Boyle,' and Mr. Justice Nelson dissented on the ground that
the condemnation was not warranted; and he expressed his
dissent " not on account of the amount of property involved,
though that is considerable, or from any particular interest
connected with the case, but from a conviction that there is a
tendency, on the part of the belligerent, to press the right of
blockade beyond its proper limits, and thereby unwittingly aid
in the establishment of rules that are often found inconvenient,
and felt as a hardship, when, in the course of events, the
belligerent has become a neutral."
The dissenting Justice is quoted by Mr. W. B. Lawrence
as saying, soon after the decision of this case by the Supreme
Court, what follows:
"The truth is," he said, "the feeling of the country was
deep and strong against England, and the judges as individual
citizens, were no exception to this feeling. As to the feeling
of hostility to England at the time, Judge Black told me that,
after my dissenting opinion in this case was read, one of the
most eminent members of the bar had said to him that 'the
delivery of it was the greatest mistake of my life."' " Now,"
added Judge Nelson, " that the passions and prejudices of the
hour had passed away, there are not, and cannot be, two
different opinions in that case." In the same article it is said,
" Neither the Executive nor Congress, at the commencement
of the difficulties with the South, seem to have distinguished
between municipal and belligerent rights, nor as to the different
jurisdictions by which they were to be enforced."
I Hunter, Etc., V. U. S., 2 Wall. 135.
9 Cranch. 191.
International Obligations, North American Review, July-Aug., 1878.
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In this case the Mixed Claims Commission I practically
overruled the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and awarded to the several claimants, according to
their respective interests, two hundred and twenty-five thou-
sand one hundred and seventy-four dollars ($225,174). The
American Commissioner read a dissenting opinion.
Contraband of War.
In time of war the belligerent contends for the rigor of war,
and the neutral insists upon the freedom of commerce, and
each successive conflict tends to energize the contention of
these conflicting interests. The Law of Nations, designed for
the welfare of all nations, whether in time of peace or during
war, has always aimed to establish principles and rules of
conduct applicable under these varying conditions that would
be uniform, equitable and just to all parties ; but the struggle
for supremacy on the part of these conflicting interests has
largely influenced practice.
The general law of contraband may be given under two
heads, as follows:
i. A state may not lawfully furnish contraband articles to
either belligerent, whether shipment be by land or by water.
2. The citizens of a neutral state may sell contraband articles
to a belligerent (ships of war or torpedo boats excepted) subject
only to the risk of capture by the cruisers of the opposing
belligerent. That is to say, such trade is legal from the
neutral point of view and illegal from the belligerent point of
view. The neutral state is not bound to prevent the trade;
but a belligerent may prevent it by seizing the goods in transit
on the ocean, by the law of right of self-defence and self-
preservation.
In the case of the Peterhoff2 the Supreme Court made the
following general classes: The first consists of articles manu-
factured and primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes
in time of war; the second, of articles which may be and are
used for purposes of war and peace, according to circumstances;
1Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, Article xlii.
2 5 Wall. 28.
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and the third, of articles exclusively used for peaceful purposes.
Merchandise of the first class, destined for a belligerent country
or places occupied by the army or navy, is always contraband;
merchandise of the second class is contraband only when
actually destined to the military or naval use of a belligerent;
while merchandise of the third class is not contraband at all,
although liable to seizure and condemnation for violation of
blockade or siege.
In the case of the Commercen' the court held that, by the
modern law of nations, provisions are not, in general, deemed
contraband, but they may become so, although the property
of a neutral, on account of the particular situation of the war
or on account of the destination. If destined for the ordinary
use of life in the enemy's country they are not, in general,
contraband, but it is otherwise if destined for military use.
Hence, if destined for the army or navy of the enemy, or for
his ports of naval or military equipment, they are deemed
contraband.
Articles contraband of war are divided into two classes:
First, such as are absolutely contraband; a d second, such as
are conditionally contraband.
President McKinley, by proclamation of April 26, 1898,
declared that "the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the
exception of contraband of war.2 Articles conditionally con-
traband are: Coal, when destined for a naval station, a port
of call, or a ship or ships of the enemy; materials for the
construction of railways or telegraphs, and money, when such
materials or money are destined for the enemy's forces; pro-
visions, when destined for an enemy's ship or ships, or for a
place that is besieged." Horses are included in the class
absolutely contraband.
Contraband- may be furnished by citizens to belligerents
without a breach of neutrality, either under international law
or the municipal law of the United States. These laws are
Ii Wheaton, 382.
2 A list of contraband of war issued by authority of the executive de-
partment, appears in the "Instructions to Blockading Vessels and
Cruisers. "
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satisfied by the external penalty of confiscation of such of
these articles as shall fall into the hands of the belligerent
powers on their way to the ports of their enemies.'
Destination to a neutral port will not protect from capture
articles contraband where an ultimate destination to the
enemy's country or blockaded port can be shown, the
immediate neutral destination being used only to cover the
transaction.2 In all such cases the transportation or voyage
of the contraband goods is to be considered as a unit, from
the port of lading to the port of delivery in the enemy's
country; and if any part of such voyage or transportation be
unlawful (from the standpoint of the belligerent), it is unlawful
throughout; and the vessel and her cargo are subject to
capture as well before arriving at the first neutral port at which
she touches after her departure from the original port as on
the voyage or transportation by sea from such neutral port to
the port of the enemy. When goods are once clearly shown
to be contraband, confiscation is the natural consequence.
This is the practice in all cases, as to the article itself, except-
ing provisions; and as to them, when they become contra-
band, the ancient and strict right of forfeiture is softened down
to a right of preemption on reasonable terms.3  The
question whether particular articles are contraband or not
contraband of war is one of evidence, to be determined in
each case by reference not to one particular rule of law, but
many; not to any one fact, however strong that may be, but
t6 all the circumstances connected with the goods in question.
It is not only, or not so much, whether the goods are in
themselves, or as belonging to a class, capable of being applied
to a military or naval use, but whether, from all the circum-
stances connected with them, those very goods are or are not
destined for such use.
As to the neutral carrier, it is said:
"By the present practice of nations, if the neutral has done
1 Wharton, Int. Law Dig. III, 391, where the authorities and rulings
are collected.
2The Hart, 3 Wall. 559.
3Kent Comm. I., p 14'.
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no more than carry goods for another which are in law con-
traband, the only penalty upon him is the loss of his freight,
time and expenses. If he makes use of fraudulent devices to
mislead the belligerent and defeat or impair the right of search,
he is liable to condemnation for unneutral acts in aid of the
enemy. So, if he not only carries contraband goods, but
engages in a contraband service . . . . But if the vessel has
no relations with the enemy's government, and, as a private
merchant vessel, is carrying goods on private account, as mer-
chandise, to the enemy's ports, to be put into the market there
or delivered into private hands, she is not, as the practice is
now settled, liable to condemnation, whatever be the character
of the cargo . . . . The interests of peace and commerce on
the one hand, and those of war on the other, have, in the
conflict of their forces, rested at a practical line of settlement.
The interests of peace have prevailed so far as to permit the
carrier to transport contraband goods, subject to no other
penalty than the loss of his commercial enterprise, i. e., his
freight and expenses, while the interests of war have prevailed
so far as to permit the belligerent to stop the contraband
goods on their passage and convert them into his own use.
The advantage of this is that the carrying trade of the world
may go on, subject to an ascertainable risk, which may be
provided for by contract and guarded against by insurance;
and producers and merchants can continue their business and
procure transportation without criminality, taking the risk of
the capture and condemnation of noxious articles. At the
same time the belligerents have the further security of being
able to condemn all the interests involved, whether vessel or
cargo, if there have been fraudulent practice or hostile service.1 "
Infections nature of Contraband. Contraband articles are
said to be of an infectious nature, and they contaminate the
whole cargo belonging to the same owners. The innocence
of any particular article is not usually admitted to exempt it
from the general confiscation. By the ancient law the ship
was liable to condemnation ; but by the modern law the act
1Dana's Wheaton, p. 66I, note ; Kent, Comm. I, p. 142.
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of carrying contraband is attended only with the loss of freight
and expenses, unless the ship belongs to the owner of the
contraband articles, or the carrying of them has been connected
with malignant and aggravating circumstances; and among
those circumstances, a false destination and false papers are
considered as the most heinous. In those cases, and in all
cases of fraud in the owner or the ship, or his agent, the
penalty is carried beyond the refusal of freight and expenses,
and is extended to the confiscation of the ship, and the
innocent parts of the cargo.'
Penalties Affecting Contraband. In strictness, every article
which is either necessarily contraband, or which has become so
from the special circumstances of the war, is liable to confisca-
tion ; but it is usual for those nations who vary their list of
contraband to subject the latter class to preemption only, which,
by the English practice, means purchase of the merchandise at
its market value, together with a reasonable profit, usually
calculated at ten per cent. on the amount. This mitigation of
extreme privileges is also introduced in the case of product4
native to the exporting country, even when they are affected
by an inseparable taint of contraband.2
The Trent Affair. In November, I86r, Captain Wilkes, of
the U. S. war steamer San Jacinto, after firing a round shot
and a shell, boarded the English mail packet Trent, in Old
Bahama Channel, on its passage from Havana to Southampton,
and by force carried off Messrs. Mason and Slidell, envoys or
ministers from the Confederate States, accredited respectively
to Great Britain and France, who had been taken on board as
passengers bound for England. They were conveyed to the
United States, and committed to prison; but after a formal
requisition by Great Britain, declaring the capture to be
illegal, they were surrendered by the Federal Government.
The American Secretary of State took the ground that these
envoys and their despatches were contraband of war, and that
the Trent might properly have been carried into port and
I The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28 ; Springbok, 5 Wall. i; The Bermuda, 3
Wall. 514; The Hart, 3 Wall. 559; Kent Comm. I, p. 142.
2 Hall, Int. Law, p. 585.
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condemned as prize. If such a condemnation had taken
place, it was intimated that, as there was no direct process in
prize courts against contraband persons, the adjudications
against the ship would have carried the right to detain the
persons for carrying whom she was condemned, as an indirect
consequence. But as the ship was released by Captain Wilkes
without necessity, and partly out of consideration for her inno-
cent passengers, the capture was waived while incomplete, and
the prisoners must therefore be released also. The principle
was thought to be similar to the denial of the right of bellig-
erents to search neutral vessels which the American Govern-
ment had always made. The British Government did not
acquiesce in these propositions, but denied that the conveyance
of public agents of this character to Great Britain and France,
and of their credentials or despatches (if any) on board the
Trent, was or could be a violation of the duties of neutrality
on the part of the vessel; and both for that reason, and also
because the destination of these persons and despatches was
bona fide neutral, it was thought certain that they were not
contraband. The government further declared that it would
not acquiesce in the capture of any British merchant ship in
circumstances similar to those of the Trent, even though it
was brought before a prize court. Mr. Dana thinks that this
case can be considered as having settled but one principle,
and that no longer disputed: that a public ship, though of a
nation at war, cannot take persons out of a neutral vessel at
sea whatever may be the claim of her government on those
persons.'
Maritime Prizes.
Prize is a technical term to express a legal capture. In order
to constitute a capture, some act should be done indicative of
an intention to seize and to retain as prize; and it is sufficient
if such intention is fairly to be inferred from the conduct of the
captor.' Questions of prize are exclusively of admiralty juris-
diction.3 In the United States the district courts act as
'Kent, Comm. 13th ed., I, p. 153, note; Wheat., Dana's note, 228.
2 Miller v. The Resolution, 2 Dall. i ; The Grotius, 9 Cranch, 368.
8 Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dal. i9.
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courts of common law and also as courts of admiralty.
The prize jurisdiction of a court of admiralty'is that which
authorizes it to take cognizance of captures made on the
high seas jure belli; of captures in foreign ports and harbors;
of captures made by naval forces on land; of surrenders
to naval forces, either solely or by joint operation with
land forces, and this without regard t thire character of the
property captured, whether ships, goods, or mere choses in
action ; of captures made in rivers, ports and harbors of the
enemy's country; and of moneys or property paid or received
as ransom or commutation on a capitulation to naval forces,
whether alone or jointly with land forces, for the purpose of
determining whether the property captured or surrendered is
or is not lawful prize of war, to the end that if determined to
be not lawful prize, restitution may be decreed, uncondition-
ally or upon terms; and if it be determined that it is lawful
prize, condemnation and sale may be decreed, followed by a
decree of distribution of. its proceeds, pursuant to the law
which regulates such distribution. The right to all captures
vests primarily in the sovereign, and no individual can have
any interest in a prize, whether made by a public or private
armed vessel, but what he receives under the grant of the
state.' "I know of no other definition of prize goods," said
Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell), in the case of the Two
Frienzds,2 "than that they are goods taken on the high seas
jure belli, out of the hands of the enemy."
The district courts possess all the powers of a prize court
and have cognizance of complaints, by whomsoever instituted,
in cases of captures made within the United States. In prize
cases appeals from the final decrees of the district court may
be carried direct to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The rules of international law recognized are those admitted
by common custom at the period when the United States
became independent, except when modified by treaty. And
I Kent Comm. I, pp. oo, 354, 355; Upton, Maritime Warfare and
Prize, p. 388; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152; Stewart v. U.S., i Court of
Claims (Nott & H.), 113.
2 1 C. Rob. 271.
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the practice of our prize courts, which are the real expounders
of the law, conforms to that of the British courts, except when
modified by treaty. But the rules adopted by Great Britain
since the United States ceased to be a part of the British
Empire are entitled to no more authority in our courts than
those of other countries. The exclusive jurisdiction in prize
of the admiralty was asserted as to captures made on the
Mississippi river during the Civil War. But Congress enacted'
that no property seized or taken upon any of the inland waters
of the United States by the naval forces thereof should be
regarded as maritime prize, but that it should be delivered to
the proper officers of the courts, or as provided in that act
and the act approved March 12, 1863,2 as to abandoned and
captured property. Private property captured on land by the
naval forces was held not to be maritime prize, subject to the
prize jurisdiction of the United States courts, though a proper
subject of capture.4 It has been said that captures by the
army and navy jointly are not distributable in the admiralty
apart from statute; and in this country they accrue exclu-
sively to the benefit of the United States.5 The Act of July
17, 1862,6 authorized a proceeding in rem in the district courts,
conformable to those in admiralty or revenue cases, against
the property of Confederates during the Civil War.
7
When certain Spanish vessels were captured in the harbor
of Santiago de Cuba, recently, by the land forces of the United
States, a claim was made by the blockading fleet for their con-
1 Act of July 2, 1864, C. 225, No. 7, 13 U. S. St. at L. 377.
12 U. S. St. at L. 820.
3 See the Cotton Plant, io Wall. 577.
4Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 4o4; U. S. v. Weed, 5 Wall. 62;
U. S. V. 26912 Bales of Cotton, I Woolw. 236; 25 Law. Rep. 451; U. S.
v. Winchester, 99 U. S. 372. But the first case was put partly on the Act
of July 17, 1862; and see 68o Pieces of Merchandise, 2 Sprague, 233;
1O3 Casks of Rice, Blatch. Pr. 211 ; 282 Bags of Cotton, ib. 302, which were
decided the other way, on their peculiar circumstances.
I The Siren, i Lowell, 280; The Siren 13 Wall. 389; Porter v. U. S., io6
U. S. 607.
6 C. 195, No. 7, 12 St. at L. 591.
Kent Comm. I, p. 357, text and notes; Upton's Maritime Warfare
and Prize, pp. 383, et seq.
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demnation as prize; but this claim was denied and the vessels
were held to be the property of the government. This inci-
dent provoked discussion in the public press, which developed
the existence of a considerable sentiment in favor of the abol-
ishment of naval prize. Under advice of the Judge Advocate
General, the United States has restored to the individual or
corporate owners the several merchant vessels found in the
harbor, on the ground that it is illegal for the army to take
private property of any kind as booty. The Executive Depart-
ment has also dismissed the appeals to the Supreme Court in
the cases of the Spanish private merchant vessels, Mguel'
fover and Catalina, captured on the high seas on the
ground that they were within the spirit, if not the letter of the-
Executive Proclamation, granting time for enemy's vessels to
depart from American ports.
The constitution of prize courts is an anomaly in juris-
prudence; but the law of prize is part of the law of nations,
and prize courts are said to be "tribunals of the law of
nations," and the jurisprudence they administer is a part of'
that law. They deal with cases of capture as distinguished
from seizures; their decrees are decrees of condemnation, not.
of forfeiture; they judge the character and relations of the
vessel and cargo, and not the acts of persons.' Still it results
that every decision of a prize tribunal is, or results in, a
national act. The sovereign must either carry it out, or set it.
aside. The latter he will not be permitted to do, unless it be
in his own favor. As a judicial decision, it is the most
solemn and responsible opinion a learned doctor of the law
can give; and, as a national act, it is done on the most
solemn responsibility that can rest on a sovereign.
2
"The judgments of prize courts having jurisdiction are
conclusive; but not when not in conformity with international
law. These courts are viewed in two aspects: The first is
that of international tribunals, in which capacity they bind the
thing acted on everywhere, and bind the parties so far as con--
'The Rapid, 8 Cranch. 155; Opinions of Attorney Generals, II, p.-
445.
2 Dana's Wheat. p. 28, note.
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cerns such thing. The second is that of domestic tribunals
(in which light they are to be considered in all respects,
except as to the proceedings in rein), which are simply agents
of the sovereign which commissions them. Hence, a sover-
eign is as much liable internationally for the wrongful action of
prize courts as he is for the wrongful action of any other courts.
It was consequently held in the case of the Betsey, before the
London Commission of 1798-1804, that while in particular
the decisions of prize courts bind the parties, so far as concerns
the particular litigation acting in rem, they may be contested
by the government of the party which feels aggrieved."'
These tribunals have been the most convenient for the pur-
poses for which they were designed; and, in general, they
have worked out satisfactory ends. The time may be approch-
ing when a regularly constituted International Prize Court will
be established by the paramount maritime powers. Influences
in that direction are already in operation.'
I Wharton, Int. Law, Vol. III, Sec. 329 a.
2 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International, Ghent, 1878, Vol. X.
pP. 113-130.
As a result of a number of Prize causes originating during the recent
war between the United States and Spain and disposed of by U. S. District
Courts, the following decisions have been rendered: A Spanish merchant
vessel captured after the declaration of war by a U. S. Cruiser while
bound from a neutral to a Spanish port, is lawful prize. Act of 25 April,
1898, declaring that war has existed since 21 April, 1898, between the
United States and Spain, fixes the precise period when the duties and
obligations imposed by the condition of war arise: The Rita, 87 Fed. 925.
The President's proclamation of 26 April, 1898, exempting from capture
Spanish vessels in American ports, applied to vessels in such ports at the
outbreak of the war though they sailed before the date of the proclama-
tion. Vessels of war have the right, in the absence of any declaration of
exemption by the political power, to capture enemy's property whenever
and wherever found afloat, and the burden is on the claimant to show
that it comes within the exemption of any such proclamation. Vessels or
cargo belonging to trading houses in the enemy's country, or to corpora-
tions formed under the laws thereof are subject to capture, regardless of
the domicile of the partners or stockholders. The exemption declared by
the President's proclamation in favor of neutral goods under the enemy's
flag applies to the case of a capture between the outbreak of hostilities
and the date of the proclamation. The fifth article of the President's
proclamation, exempting from capture Spanish vessels bound for American
ports at the outbreak of hostilities, does not apply to vessels which sailed
FROM THE AMERICAN POINT OF YIRW.
Claims for bounty granted by the United States Statutes'
for the destruction of the public vessels of an enemy
stand upon different and higher ground than prize for the
capture of private property of enemy subjects, and are not
properly subject of the adverse criticism which is directed
against the latter. In regard to the former, an Auditor of the
Treasury Department was reported to have recently ruled th't
such claims may not be settled directly by the Treasury De-
partment, as was the current impression they would be, but
that they require adjudication by a court. A protest has
already been interposed to this ruling, and it is insisted on
behalf of the beneficiaries that full jurisdiction is granted the
Executive Department to settle these claims; that there is no
statutory requirement of adjudication express or implied; and
that no jurisdiction exists for these claims in prize courts.
Upon inquiry at the Treasury Department, it is learned that
as no question as to the proper procedure or forum for the
adjustment of these bounty claims had yet arisen, that Depart-
ment had not made any ruling or taken any action thereon.
The opinion was, however, unofficially expressed, that, in the
absence of further legislation, the precedent furnished by the
action of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
sitting as a District Court of the United States, in the year
from European ports for Cuba, there to discharge, though in the ordinary
course they would then come to an American for port cargo. An enemy's
vessel clearing from an American port for a foreign port prior to the out-
break of hostilities, with liberty to touch at another American port for
coal, was not "bound" for such port, so as to be exempt from capture
under the President's proclamation of 26 April, 1898. Enemy's vessels
are subject to capture after the actual outbreak of hostilities though no
declaration or proclamation of war has yet been made. Cargo shipped in
enemy's vessels, by neutrals to parties in the enemy's country, is pre-
sumptively enemy's property, but the presumption may be overcome by
evidence. Cargo shipped from this country in an enemy's vessel, to
residents of a neutral country, is presumptively neutral cargo: The Buena
Ventura, 87 Fed. 927.
Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States have been taken in
these several cases and are now pending, except in the cases of the Miguel
.Tover and the Catalina, which, as already stated, the appeals on behalf of
the United States have been withdrawn by the Attorney-General.
4 4635.
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1873, in the cases of the Fanny, Seabird, Black Warrior, and
Forrest, would be followed. The decision of the District Court
(In Admiralty, Wylie, J.), rendered March I, 1870, in the
matter of the bounty claims of Farragut and others, dismis-
sing the libel therein filed, for want of jurisdiction, on the
ground that head money or bounty is not prize under the law,
but a gratuity which the Government has promised to dis-
tribute under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, is
cited by counsel on behalf of beneficiaries in support of the
contention that these claims should be settled by the account-
ing officers of the Treasury Department.
The Executive Policy of the United States in Respect to the
Exemption of Private Property, except Contraband of War,
from Capture at Sea.
A contemporary writer calls attention to the fact that the
attitude of the United States from its foundation, down to the
outbreak of the present war between Spain and the United
States, has been consistent in its advocacy of the exemption of
private property, except contraband of war, from capture
at sea. It is pointed out that the United States adopted
the principle in the Treaty of 1785 with Russia; pro-
posed it to England, France, and Russia in 1823, and
in 1856, at the time of the Treaty of Paris, offered to
abolish privateering in order to get it adopted by the powers.
In 1861, Mr. Seward favored its acceptance; in 1870, Mr. Fish
expressed to the Prussian Government the hope that we might
be "gratified by seeing it universally acknowledged;" in 187 1,
it was adopted through his exertions in the Treaty with Italy,
which stipulates that, in case of war between the United States
and Italy, "the private property of their respective citizens and
subjects, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be
exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere
by the armed vessels or by the military forces of either party,"
except in the attempt to enter a blockaded port. "The
attitude of this government," says the writer, "in this respect is
fixed; and whatever might be said for or against the adoption
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of the principle in the present war with Spain, and as to whether
Spain would have probably granted or refused reciprocal treat-
ment, in view of the reservation made by it in regard to priva-
teering (in its acceptance of the principles of the Declaration of
Paris), all the arguments which led to the early and consistent
advocacy of the principle by this government still obtain." '
Alexander Porter Morse.
Washington, October i9, 1898.
1 W. L. Penfield, "International Piracy in Time of War," North Amer-
ican Review, July, 1898.
